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ABSTRACT 
In response to increasing income inequality, many private educational institutions have adapted 
new approaches to financial aid, tuition, and campus investment. Implications of this changing 
strategy include the rise of an ‘educational arms race’—in which institutions compete to enroll 
the best (and, at times, wealthiest) students by funding non-academic services (e.g. luxury 
dorms)—and the risk of relying on such policies to establish socioeconomic diversity. My 
analysis examines the consequences and implications of rising income inequality on higher 
education finances and supply-side decisions. In particular, I assess the changes instituted by 
private, non-parochial high schools, which have policies that closely resemble those of their 
post-secondary counterparts, when faced with varying levels of local inequality. Using data from 
the National Association of Independent Schools, and standard methods for addressing pooled, 
cross-sectional, time series data, I find that income inequality does not have significant effects on 
financial aid policies or tuition. However, rising inequality does appear to significantly increase 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since the 1970s, income inequality in the United States has increased substantially, 
largely as a result of rising incomes for those at the top of the distribution and stagnating real 
wages for the poor and the middle classes. In 2013, for the first time in the past century, the 
bottom 90 percent of the income distribution controlled less than 50 percent of income in the 
United States, largely as a result of income growth in the top decile (Piketty and Saez 2007, 
Figure 1). Consequences of this widening disparity disproportionately affect lower- and middle-
income populations, whose mental and physical health, likelihood of imprisonment, and 
academic success worsen as the income gap increases. Epidemiological and economic research 
alike posit that these negative externalities may lead to further social alienation of the highest 
income-earners, and thereby, greater differences in quality of life across the income distribution 
(Pickett and Wilkinson, 2009). Though there is an extensive literature on the causes and effects 
of increased income inequality on individuals, few studies have addressed its relevance to 
institutions of higher education.   
However, recent coverage of income inequality in the United States has drawn attention 
to the implications of this trend on educational attainment and social mobility. Catharine Hill, the 
presiding president of Vassar College, who has encouraged her peers to improve socioeconomic 
diversity in their own institutions, has consistently written and spoken about the interaction 
between income inequality and education. In particular, Hill has brought attention to the 
challenges and opportunities that growing income inequality poses to elite, selective institutions 
of higher education, many of which operate on a high-aid, high-tuition financial framework. But 
to operate on such a scheme—in which high-income students pay the full “sticker price” of 
tuition, while low-income students are offered generous financial aid packages—many colleges 
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and universities must reconsider their admissions policies, budgetary structures, and prospective 
student targets. Hill (2014) suggests: “Greater income inequality increases the demand for 
services at one end of the income distribution at the same time that it increases the need for 
financial aid at the other end.” In other words, colleges must attract enough high-income students 
to fund their financial aid policies, or else risk endangering low-income students’ access to elite 
institutions of higher education (Boyd et al., 2005).  
Hill also borrows extensively from a theory proposed by Gordon Winston, formerly of 
Williams College, which states that colleges and universities seek to fund their generous 
financial aid policies by attracting students from the top of the income distribution. To attract 
these students, educational institutions “face pressures to increase spending on facilities and 
services to please students from wealthier families” (Hill 2014). Termed the “educational arms 
race,” this theory posits that the generous spending of many private colleges and universities—
often on new construction, renovations, and luxury amenities—is the result of an ongoing 
competition to compete for the most applications from high-performing, high-income students 
(that will then fund the socioeconomic diversity many of these institutions currently lack). 
However, little empirical research exists on spending decisions in higher education, let alone 
how income inequality may affect admission and budgetary policy. To contribute to this gap in 
the existing literature, I will examine the relationship between the supply-side decisions of 
educational institutions (e.g. expenditures, endowment, endowment spending, financial aid, and 
tuition policies), and changing conditions in the national income distribution. My research also 
creates insights into how educational institutions influence the demand-side (e.g. enrollment and 
matriculation) outcomes of low-income students, by providing information about the financial 
aid resources that they are offered.  
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A standard methodological approach to addressing this question would exploit the 
geographic and temporal variation of income inequality to measure how selective private 
institutions react to local changes in the distribution. Such a “difference-in-difference” empirical 
analysis would compare changes in the policies and decisions of a college in, for example, Utah 
(a state with low and stable income inequality) to those of a college in California (a state with 
high and growing income inequality). If a college in California raised its spending on financial 
aid, for instance, as incomes in that state become more unequal relative to those in Utah, then 
perhaps growing inequality is to blame.  
For this approach to be appropriate, these schools would need to be responsive only to the 
level of income inequality in their respective states. However, most selective private colleges and 
universities draw from a nationwide market of students, and so do not necessarily respond to 
local inequality conditions. Instead, these elite institutions attract and enroll students from across 
the country, many of whom were raised with correspondingly disparate levels of income 
inequality. As such, high-achieving students from Utah and California would both be equally 
attractive candidates for admission to a California-based private school.1 This “nationally 
integrated market” (Hoxby 1997) precludes using geographic variation in an empirical model.  
 As an alternative, there is consistent, longitudinal data for private, non-parochial 
secondary institutions, many of which are confined to local markets. In particular, private high 
schools that do not board students (i.e. day schools) are constrained to a local market of students, 
and thus, I assume, would be particularly sensitive to changes in state-specific income inequality. 
With this assumption, the empirical model I estimate will exploit the localized markets of these 
                                                
1 Note that my analysis does not necessarily extend to public institutions, which operate 
differently from private colleges and universities.  
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private high schools to determine whether disproportionate changes in income inequality have 
had differential effects on the supply-side decisions and operations of higher education.  
Although the arguments presented by Catharine Hill and those presented in the following 
literature review primarily address changes in the behavior of post-secondary institutions, they 
are similarly applicable to private, non-parochial, independent high schools. These private high 
schools, the wealthiest of which have endowments and annual tuition bills that surpass many 
private colleges (Table 1), rely on a financial model similar to that of post-secondary private 
educational institutions. Further evidence for the similarity of these private educational 
institutions will be presented forthwith, using data from the National Association of Independent 
Schools (NAIS) to support the empirical argument.  
Because of the importance of localized markets among private, secondary institutions, I 
can implement a conventional difference-in-difference approach, comparing the changes in 
institutional behavior over time, across varying levels of state-specific income inequality. The 
model assumes that institutions of higher education are aware of the changes in income 
inequality occurring throughout the country, and assesses how they choose to respond to this 
growing disparity.  
I conclude from the empirical results that private secondary schools experience 
significant endowment growth in response to increasing income inequality in the local area. In 
addition, this effect is larger for day schools, indicating that local markets play a large role in the 
decisions of private educational institutions. I also find that effects are insignificant for other 
variables of interest, such as low-income student enrollment and tuition changes. The conclusion 
will discuss these results in further depth. The paper is structured as follows: (I) Introduction; (II) 
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Literature Review; (III) Data and Empirical Strategy; (IV) Results; (V) Conclusion. Regression 
tables, figures, and notes follow in an appendix.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The extensive literature on college admissions and income inequality belies the dearth of 
research on the intersection of these two subjects. It is particularly surprising in view of recent 
popular concern over growing income inequality in the United States, as well as Thomas 
Piketty’s publication of Capital (2014). Thus, this review will begin with a discussion of the 
literature on income inequality and demand-side factors, then proceed to discuss prior research 
on the operations, expenditures, and other supply-side decisions of higher education institutions.  
A. Income Inequality and Demand-Side Decisions 
 Demand-side decisions encompass any incentives that influence student enrollment and 
matriculation at colleges and universities. The literature on student demand for education is 
extensive, and suggests that students from low socio-economic backgrounds are much less likely 
to enroll in higher education, let alone complete their degrees. Furthermore, high-income 
students have increasingly opted to attend private institutions, while their low-income 
counterparts attend public universities and community colleges (McPherson and Schapiro 2006).  
Though low-income student enrollment has steadily increased in the past two decades, recent 
research has found that “only 14 percent of students come from the lower 50 percent of families 
by income” in the nation’s most competitive colleges (Carnevale and Strohl 2010). The authors 
of this study suggest that this lack of low-income enrollment may be related to trends in income 
inequality.  
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However, in the last two decades, this same education system has substantially increased 
offers of need- and merit-based financial aid. In fact, the simultaneous rise of financial aid and 
polarization of low- and high-income students may reflect the growing institutional competition 
and budgetary pressures that colleges and universities face. Epple et al. (2003) and Burd (2013) 
suggest that there exists a “hierarchy of school quality.” This hierarchy consists of three types of 
educational institutions: (1) those that offer generous financial aid and enroll many low-income 
students (e.g. elite private colleges); (2) those that offer limited amounts of financial aid (often in 
the form of merit scholarships) and enroll few low-income students (e.g. non-elite private 
colleges without the resources to fund low-income students); and (3) those that offer little 
financial aid and enroll few low-income students (e.g. institutions with few resources). The first 
category includes elite, selective private colleges, which have increasingly attempted to attract 
low-income students (for reasons that will be described in the supply-side literature).2 However, 
other colleges that more strongly identify with the second or third type often rely on merit 
scholarships to attract high-income, full-pay students. For example, in 2012, Denison University 
offered an average of $16,000 in merit aid to more than 40 percent of its students (Drew 2012). 
Yet, in 2014, only 17 percent of Denison’s students were from low-income families (as measured 
by Pell Grant recipiency). Denison University typifies the kind of institution that offers financial 
aid in the form of generous merit scholarships, but still fails to enroll a high proportion of low-
income students (Leonhardt 2014).3  
 Such polarized aid policies have contributed to the high sticker prices of private colleges 
and universities (Reardon 2012) and to the nationally integrated market described by Hoxby 
                                                
2 Stanford University recently began to offer full scholarships to students whose families make 
less than $125,000 per year (Gordon 2015). 
3 For scale, 23 percent of students are Pell grant recipients at Vassar College, which has sought 
to increase socioeconomic diversity in recent admissions cycles. 
Di Lucido 10 
(1997). Avery and Hoxby (2013) also find that low-income, high-achieving students are often 
unaware of the generous financial aid policies available within the hierarchy of school quality. 
Though some colleges have attempted to create awareness of the generous financial aid available 
for these students, such actions may pose a threat to the specific financial model that allows such 
liberal policies: to offer need-blind, need-based financial aid, selective colleges must rely on a 
constant population of high-income students. Here, the intersection of demand-side (applicant 
decisions) and supply-side (institutional decisions) preferences becomes apparent: although 
many colleges and universities value socioeconomic diversity, it cannot exist without the 
matriculation of those students whose families most benefit from rising income inequality.  
B. The Educational Arms Race 
 In response to growing demand for socioeconomic diversity, colleges have markedly 
changed the way they approach supply-side decisions, which include enrollment, endowment, 
financial aid, expenditure, income, and capital giving policies. The educational arms race is a 
general term that encompasses the decisions of (generally private) institutions that seek to attain 
or sustain their prestige in the market of higher education.  As universities and colleges strive to 
attract top students—in order to attain prestige and financial security—they are compelled to 
enroll low-income, high-performing students who increase the academic reputation of an 
institution, but also require greater amounts of financial aid.  
Gordon Winston explained the changing responses of colleges and universities to 
financial aid, tuition, and capital expenditures as “the positional arms race in higher education” 
(2000). Winston posited that because colleges work within the framework of customer-input 
technology—in which the value of a good is subject to the quality of those who buy it—student 
demand is sensitive to the quality of a school’s current student population. As such, colleges seek 
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to attract high-performing students, regardless of their need for financial aid (1999), in order to 
sustain their reputational position in popular college rankings or the academic community. 
Winston asserts that effective positional competition would rise from the lower ranks of a 
hierarchy—lower-ranked schools have more incentive to improve than their elite peers. Thus, 
most colleges must continuously improve their quality in order to outpace their competition.  
Winston’s hypothesis suggests that, as a result of the educational arms race, many 
colleges and universities instituted generous need-based financial aid policies in the late 1980s 
and 1990s to subsidize low-income, high-performing students. Winston (2000) clarifies that 
these institutions preferred to increase subsidies to low-income students as opposed to decreasing 
nominal prices for the general student population. Such opposition to decreased prices may be a 
response to the “Chivas Regal Phenomenon” described by Duffy and Goldberg (1998), in which 
nominal tuition prices serve as a marker of quality that lends to the academic reputation of an 
educational institution.  
Trends in the supply of high-performing students can have a significant effect on a 
university’s decision to enroll low-income students. Ehrenberg et al. (2006) conclude that an 
increase in the “number of institutionally funded National Merit Scholarship winners at an 
institution is associated with a reduction in the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution.” 
Since Pell Grant recipiency is a good proxy for low-income student enrollment at an institution, 
the study’s findings support the hypothesis that the decision to enroll low-income students may 
simply be a response to increasing positional competition within higher education. In other 
words, if high-achieving, high-income students are applying to a college, there is little need to 
attract high-achieving, low-income students. Frank (2001) supports Winston’s assertion that elite 
institutions tend to refrain from lowering tuition (in order to attract high-performing, low-income 
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students), and, further, asserts that merit-based aid has begun to displace need-based aid in those 
institutions where the highest-performing students are also affluent students. A more in-depth 
discussion of financial aid will follow this section.  
Frank (2001) also discusses the various responses of colleges and universities to the 
educational arms race. Many of them are described by Mause (2009) as “excessive signaling”—
advertisement and indicators of prestige that lack social value and only work to establish 
positional reputation. These indicators include distinguished faculty hiring, expensive 
advertisement to prospective students, high material standards of on-campus residential life, 
tuition discounts, and large capital and infrastructural investments. Zemsky et al. (2005) gives a 
detailed account of the impact of popular rankings and public perceptions of academic 
reputation, which have resulted in an “admissions arms race that drains institutional resources 
and energies.”    
Recent research on these material expenditures suggests that they align significantly with 
the student population they are intended to attract. Jacob et al. (2013) find that while preferences 
for amenities, such as student activities, athletics, and luxury living accommodations, are 
common to most students, only high-performing students show a significant preference for 
academic quality. As a result, “more selective schools have a much greater incentive to improve 
academic quality since this is the dimension most valued by its marginal students.” Alternatively, 
less selective, private schools tend to improve material standards at a disproportionate rate—
demand pressures explain 16 percent of the difference between their spending priorities and that 
of more selective institutions (Jacob et al. 2013). When other characteristics are included, such as 
endowment size, student population, and total expenditures, the authors are able to account for 
more of the variation in expenditures.  
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In an empirical study evaluating the contemporary challenges facing liberal arts colleges, 
McPherson and Schapiro (1999) find similar results: since the 1980s, highly selective liberal arts 
colleges have retained their share of high-performing, high-income students, while less-selective 
private colleges have lost the same share of students. Though both types of institutions have 
become part of the educational arms race—in that they have embraced subsidization of low-
income students and favored “resource-wasting maneuvers to gain tactical advantage, rather than 
strategic investment in quality”—highly selective institutions’ investments are more efficient. 
This could indicate that, as Rothschild and White (1993) assert, highly selective institutions 
compete within a nationwide market of their peers, while less-selective institutions compete 
within regional markets that are sensitive to external factors. The argument of Rothschild and 
White would support my hypothesis that private high schools, which compete in localized 
markets, are an effective proxy for private colleges, in that they also respond to external shocks 
in terms of positional competition and the educational arms race.  
C. Financial Aid and Tuition 
 Gordon Winston includes financial aid and tuition as central components of the 
educational arms race. However, others have researched the independent changes to financial aid 
and tuition that occur as the result of external shocks to educational institutions (Ehrenberg & 
Murphy, 1993). Nagler (2008) also presents a model that considers the effects of positive and 
negative shocks to college revenue on tuition for low- and high-income students. A positive 
shock, such as a major donation or capital gift, would lower tuition for all students, though it also 
results in lower enrollment for high-income students. This reduction in high-paying students 
reflects the institution’s desire to raise its admissions standards (in order to attract the best 
students, regardless of income) and reduce “charges net of financial aid across all student 
Di Lucido 14 
categories.” Nagler’s model also explores the hypothesis that, after a positive shock, students 
who are academically substandard may be perceived as “inferior goods”, in that they are only 
needed in the instance of a negative shock. For example, a private college would only seek to 
enroll average-performing, high-income students during poor economic conditions; in all other 
economic conditions, and particularly in positive external circumstances, the college would 
prefer to reject these same students. However, Nagler’s model lacks empirical evidence to 
support these results.4   
 Tuition, though it remains an important component of an institution’s revenue stream, 
plays a large role in the criticism of private colleges and universities. In most of these 
institutions, “part of every dollar of tuition revenue generated by a tuition increase is used to 
provide increased grant assistance for those students whose need is increased by the tuition 
increase” (Ehrenberg and Murphy 1993). Since the 1980s, tuition has been used as a mechanism 
for institutions with generous financial aid policies to garner increasing amounts of revenue from 
high-income students, which subsidizes aid for low-income, high-achieving students (Nagler 
2008). However, tuition also has become a marker of quality that is used by lower-tier colleges 
and universities to attract high-income students, regardless of their academic quality.5 Though 
originally associated with oil shocks, increasing energy prices, tightening faculty markets, and 
                                                
4 William Bennett, who was the Secretary of Education under President Reagan, once remarked 
that private institutions probably increase tuition when they received more federal aid. 
McPherson and Schapiro (1998) discredit his remarks, finding empirical evidence that private 
institutions neither increase tuition nor change their spending on instructional expenses when 
there is an increase in federal aid. However, the research did find that private educational 
institutions tend to increase financial aid when federal aid increases (though they do not decrease 
it when federal aid decreases).  
5 One example of this is George Washington University, which, under the guidance of Stephen 
Joel Trachtenberg, went from a low-cost continuing education institution to one of the most 
expensive universities in the market. Its rise is often attributed to tuition increases (indicative of 
the Chivas Regal Phenomenon described by Duffy and Goldberg) and expensive construction 
projects that emphasized high material living standards and student quality-of-life.    
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unfavorable exchange rates, rising tuition prices are now associated with a geographical 
expansion of the applicant pool of elite institutions (Hoxby 1997) and dwindling federal and state 
support for educational aid. In addition, Ehrenberg and Rizzo (2004) indicate that recent 
increases in tuition may be the product of rising costs of technology, expanded student services, 
positional competition, and generous institutional financial aid.   
D. Expenditures  
Private colleges and universities occupy a niche in the market for higher education. For 
the elite institutions in this category that are competitive within the market, tuition is not 
bounded by demand (Breneman 2001). This elasticity implies that these institutions are free to 
raise tuition to any rate that would suit their financial needs and associated expenditures. 
However, as noted in the previous sections, the market that they face is one of customer-input 
technologies, in which those who decide to enroll determine the quality of the institution. 
Intuitively then, the subsidy of an education at one of these institutions is determined by the total 
cost, less any tuition paid. Thus, as elite private colleges and universities began to enroll more 
low-income students during the early 1990s, the income gap decreased as their subsidies grew 
and tuition-paid fell.  
Although instructional costs consume a substantial proportion of the average institutional 
budget, an optimal expenditure model traditionally ignores the capital costs associated with the 
“administrative lattice” (Duffy and Goldberg 1998, Winston 1993). Instead, the most scrutinized 
expenditures are often those designated for maintenance, faculty, and staff. A model of private 
colleges developed by Nordhaus (1989) finds that government-spending risks, especially federal 
budget uncertainty, outweigh all other external influences. Secondary influences include changes 
in the stock market, interest rates, inflation, and wage trends; because most institutions are not 
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demand-constrained (there will be student demand, regardless), their finances are usually 
insulated from the business cycle. However, in the instance of an external shock, Nordhaus does 
not consider the demand constraints that occur when institutions are forced to admit substandard 
students. 
E. Endowments 
 Nordhaus also remarks that many educational institutions do not smooth their budget 
spending as they would their endowment spending. Smoothing of endowment spending is 
constituted by a moving average—if an endowment falls in value one year, it should not result in 
lowered spending in the immediate future, but in small changes to the endowment output over 
time (usually five years). A more recent paper from Brown et al. (2014) empirically determines 
that universities respond differently to positive and negative shocks to their endowments. For 
positive shocks (e.g. a large gift or economic boom), endowment payouts do not change, and 
instead follow the five-year moving average example described above. But for negative shocks, 
such as an economic recession, universities tend to reduce their economic payouts, as well as 
tenure-track faculty. The study interprets these results as evidence that endowments may serve as 
a buffer against external shocks. It also provides insight into the rapid growth of endowments 
observed in the past two decades.  
 Even before the diversification of the endowment investment portfolio, spearheaded by 
Yale University, Hausmann (1990) predicted that educational institutions are relatively similar to 
other corporations, in that they must carefully guard against elevated future expectations. 
Hoarding endowments may be a behavior that seeks to equalize intergenerational expenditures, 
though Hausmann argues that it is more rational for the future to subsidize the present than vice 
versa (because of constant economic growth that would build the value of the endowment). 
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Further, Hausmann asserts that unnecessarily large endowments make little sense for educational 
institutions, as they are buffered from external demands by the contributions of private donors 
and expect relatively constant demand and revenue. Nevertheless, universities and colleges also 
face lifetime faculty expenses, poor collateral, and few options to sell equity.   
F. Summary: Changes in the Education Market 
 From this literature, it is apparent that colleges and universities have made significant 
changes to their decision-making processes in the last two decades, many of which coincide with 
rising income inequality in the United States. The positional competition described by Winston 
(1999) has only increased with the nationalization of the educational market, and subsequent 
increases in tuition. Though much has been written of the ways in which colleges and 
universities decide to raise, allocate, and invest their incomes, there exists little discussion of the 
role of income inequality in these decisions. Given the importance of higher education to future 
life outcomes and social mobility, my thesis examines the effect of income inequality on various 
institutional decisions, including many of those mentioned in the above sections. In addition, my 
analysis integrates the supply-side literature with that of the demand-side (e.g. low-income 
student enrollment) by illustrating the different effects of income inequality on access to and 
policies of private educational institutions. 
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III. DATA & EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
A. Data 
 The National Association of Independent Schools (NAIS) records detailed information on 
the financial and enrollment characteristics of more than 2,400 private, independent schools 
throughout the world. The initial dataset used in my analysis comprised 2,404 private domestic 
and international schools, with information on enrollment, endowment, revenues, tuition, 
financial aid, and expenditures from 1981 to 2014. By limiting the econometric analysis to 
American, non-parochial, private secondary schools without substantial omissions in reported 
information, I created a final dataset of 130 high schools, located throughout the country.6 Table 
2 lists the states where these 130 high schools are located, along with corresponding summary 
statistics for key variables.7 Although most of the observations are concentrated in the northeast 
and mid-Atlantic (70 percent), it is reassuring to find that many schools are located in 
geographically disparate areas.  
These states also display varying rates of income inequality, which permits my analysis 
to use state-specific measures of income inequality to examine whether educational institutions 
are reacting to such changes. Rather than considering marginal changes in income inequality at 
the extremes of the income distribution (e.g. comparisons of the “top 1 percent” to the “99 
percent” that are prevalent in popular discussions of income inequality), private educational 
institutions likely look to the broader circumstances of inequality in the external economic 
environment. In particular, these institutions should be sensitive to changes in the ratio of the 90th 
                                                
6 Secondary schools made up only slightly more than 19 percent of the original dataset.  
7 The number of observations for each regression varies slightly depending on the available data. 
Certain variables (e.g. annual tuition) have more consistent data, while others (e.g. endowment) 
are less consistent. Endowment data also tends to be missing during economic crises (e.g. 2008-
2009 recession) and more recent years. Note that boarding schools comprise approximately 67 
percent of the entire dataset.  
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to the 50th (median) percentile, as this ratio dictates the sticker price of attendance for the top 
decile, as well as those students eligible for financial aid. An increase in the income of the 90th 
percentile may expand an institution’s ability to offer need- or merit-based financial aid to 
families below the top income bracket (though not necessarily those in the poorest deciles).  
In addition, capital and other forms of financial giving, which often drive changes in 
private educational revenues, are much more sensitive to changes in the top percentiles. If, as the 
data exhibit, the top decile is growing richer as the median household’s income is stagnating, the 
magnitude of gifts from the top income decile may also be expected to increase. To capture this 
sensitivity, my empirical model tests the relationship between private secondary school decisions 
and the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile. In addition, the model tests the ratio of 
the 50th percentile to the 10th percentile, and posit that the results of the latter ratio should be 
small and mostly insignificant to reflect the ratio’s relative unimportance in the decisions of 
these institutions.  
I calculated income inequality ratios by using data from the American Community 
Survey (ACS) and the U.S. Census (Ruggles et al. 2015).8 I computed the 90/10 ratio as the 
state- and year-specific mean income of the top decile divided by the state- and year-specific 
mean income of the lowest decile. The 90/50 and 50/10 ratios were similarly calculated using the 
appropriate income deciles (e.g. 90/50 used the top and median deciles). Figures 2 through 4 
display the geographic variation of income inequality at the 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 ratios, 
respectively; Table 3 lists the 2014 values and percent changes over time for these same ratios. 
For example, the 90/50 measure for Utah, a state with low and stable inequality, was 2.31 in 
2014, equating to an increase of 7.2 percent since 1987. In contrast, the 90/50 measure for 
                                                
8 Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Phil Levine, for providing guidance and his own STATA 
code for these calculations. 
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California, a state with high and increasing inequality, was 2.93 in 2014, equating to an increase 
of 20.6 percent since 1987.9,10 
Given that the data are sufficiently dispersed throughout the United States, and in order to 
motivate the importance of this analysis, I seek to establish its similarities with private colleges 
and universities. Figure 5 demonstrates the similarity of the expenditure model for private 
secondary and post-secondary institutions (Snyder 2013). The path of expenditures per student 
differs little in general trend according to type of institution, although the magnitude is slightly 
greater for post-secondary institutions. However, this difference may be attributable to expenses 
that are unique to the post-secondary level, such as advanced scientific equipment, elevated 
faculty expenses, and larger institutional management structures. Figure 6 illustrates the increase 
of annual tuition at private post-secondary and secondary institutions since 1986 (Baum and Ma 
2014). The fact that secondary tuition exceeds post-secondary averages is attributable to 
inconsistencies in the post-secondary dataset.11  
                                                
9 In 1987, the median income in California was $55,260, and the median for the 90th percentile 
was $134,113. By 2014, these figures had increased to $57,625 and $168,628, respectively, 
equating to a 90/50 ratio of 2.93—a 20 percent increase in the ratio since 1987. Similarly, in 
1987, the median income in Utah was $47,855, and the 90th percentile income was $103,284. By 
2014, the median had increased to $57,700 and that of the 90th percentile to $133,478. The 
substantial increase in Utah’s median income offset the increase in the 90th percentile, which lent 
to Utah’s slow growth of income inequality—in 2014, its 90/50 ratio was 2.31, equating to a 7.2 
percent increase since 1987.  
10Note that because data were only available for census years and later ACS years (2005-2013), 
much of these data were interpolated or extrapolated. As a result, there is a risk that these data 
may contribute to measurement error in the empirical model. In particular, because the 
measurement error affects the independent variable, it is possible that there is attenuation bias in 
the results, which would bias the coefficients toward zero.  
11In particular, the private, not-for-profit, four-year institutions “post-secondary” includes do not 
exclude smaller, less well-endowed colleges and universities that charge significantly less than 
most private high schools. Although data is not available from COFHE, the Consortium on 
Financing Higher Education (which records such data as tuition for the elite, private, not-for-
profit schools that we theorize are most affected by income inequality), the magnitude of its 
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As demonstrated above, private, independent, non-parochial high schools have widely 
adopted the same financial model of their postsecondary counterparts. In particular, most of 
these schools rely on endowments, tuition, and capital gifts to generate revenue, while spending 
most of their revenues on instructional expenses and financial aid. As such, they act well as a 
proxy for private colleges and universities. Furthermore, private high schools (save for a distinct 
few, such as Phillips Exeter Academy in New Hampshire) usually draw their student bodies from 
the surrounding area, and are thus subject to local economic conditions such as the distribution of 
income. Even Phillips Exeter Academy, which has substantial resources to attract students from 
across the country (as well as from abroad), enrolled 47 percent of its students from the New 
England region in 2014 (see Figure 7). Half of these students were from New Hampshire, and 
another quarter from Massachusetts (Figure 8). As Phillips Exeter is an outlier—most private 
high schools have neither the resources nor the prestige to attract such geographic diversity—we 
assume that all other private high schools enroll fewer out-of-state students (as a percentage); in 
most cases, these schools likely enroll only in-state students. Moreover, at day schools, I assume 
all students are from the local area.  
B. Empirical Strategy 
Unlike previous research on the topic of income inequality or the finances of secondary 
and post-secondary private institutions, this analysis focuses specifically on the external 
economic environment that these schools encounter. The difference-in-difference model below 
assumes that the dependent variables would not have changed differentially over time (e.g. 
adheres to the assumption of parallel paths) if income inequality had not changed. School and 
year fixed effects are critical components of my difference-in-difference model, such that any 
                                                                                                                                                       
tuition data would likely be slightly above that of private high schools, to indicate the prestige of 
these institutions.   
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leftover variation is driven by differences in income inequality rather than unobserved 
characteristics. In particular, school fixed effects allow for school-specific characteristics and 
initial trend differences, while year fixed effects account for any time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity in the data. The standard regression model is as follows, where the subscript ‘i’ 
indicates an individual school, the subscript ‘s’ indicates an individual state, and the subscript ‘t’ 
indicates an individual year. The symbols γi and γt represent school and year fixed effects, 
respectively:  
 Yist = β0 + β1Inequalitys,t-1 + Xs,t-1Φ + γi + γt + εist     [1] 
In this standard difference-in-difference approach, six dependent variables are evaluated: 
annual tuition, endowment, total expenditures, total revenues, as well as financial aid and non-
white (non-international) students, as proportions of total enrollment. All monetary variables 
(e.g. tuition, endowment, expenditures, and revenues) are evaluated in natural log, per-student 
terms to reflect the unbounded and right-skewed range of these variables. As such, for these 
variables, β1—the main coefficient of interest—should be interpreted as the percent change as a 
variable of interest undergoes a transition from a low-income inequality area to a high-income 
inequality area. Because financial aid students and non-white students are calculated as 
percentages of total enrollment, β1 for these variables should be interpreted as a percentage 
change. Inequality measures are lagged by one year to allow time for schools to change their 
financial and enrollment policies.  
Although measuring each dependent variable in per-student terms should account for the 
variability of enrollment during this time period (Figure 9), I also weight the specification to 
strengthen the precision of the estimate. Unweighted results may produce unnecessary noise in 
the dataset. In particular, very small (often financially-volatile) institutions are much more 
Di Lucido 23 
sensitive to marginal increases in their revenue. For example, a large one-time gift would 
substantially increase the annual revenue stream (and possibly, the endowment) of a small 
school, while it would appear as a minor deviation from trend to a large, well-funded school. 
Figure 10 displays the distribution of endowments in 2014; it illustrates that slightly more than 5 
percent of schools in the dataset have very small (less than $1 million) endowments. To avoid 
skewing the precision of the analysis by giving these small schools the same weight as their 
larger counterparts, the regression specification is weighted by total enrollment. 
In addition to school and year fixed effects, I include additional covariates in order to 
account for other state-specific, time-varying external economic circumstances that may affect 
these institutions’ financial and enrollment decisions. The vector of these covariates (X) includes 
the statewide unemployment rate, the public secondary school student-teacher ratio, and the 
number of 15-19 year olds (as a percent of a state’s total population). The unemployment rate 
may affect the decisions of the consumers of private high school education, if not the schools 
themselves. For instance, I would expect that an increase in the unemployment rate may result in 
a decrease in one’s ability to pay, and perhaps simultaneously, affect the tuition and fees these 
schools decide to charge. 
The public secondary school student-teacher ratio is a proxy for the quality of public 
education in a state. In those states with high student-teacher ratios, enrollment in private 
institutions may increase. The correlation between private enrollment and the student-teacher 
ratio at public high schools is weakly positive—the higher the public secondary student-teacher 
ratio, the greater the average enrollment in private high schools. Unfortunately, the data for this 
variable do not differentiate between traditional public high schools and charter schools. Further 
research should incorporate some measurement of the rise of public and private charter schools, 
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as they may play a large role in the enrollment variability witnessed by many private, 
independent high schools.   
The final covariate included in the regression specification is a measure of the number of 
high-school aged students in the relevant states. Although school fixed effects encompass state 
fixed effects, I assume that the state-specific ratio of high school-aged individuals to the total 
population does not stay constant over time.12 Information on the composition of a state’s 
population is important to account for changes in private school policy—if a state has a 
particularly large population of high school-age students, it is likely that the demand of a private 
high school would be greater. This youth population is also broken down into four racial 
categories (white, black, Hispanic, and all others) to allow for differential effects according to 
race and ethnicity.   
I also examine whether the impact of inequality is the same between day and boarding 
schools. These specifications follow the structure of the underlying difference-in-difference 
approach, but distinguish high schools that board more or less than 50 percent of students (i.e. 
day versus boarding schools). The regression specifications are identical to the first, though the 
sample sizes are smaller.13 Although private secondary schools are likely to operate in the “local 
autarkies” described by Hoxby (1997), boarding schools may not adhere to this assumption. In 
particular, under the original hypothesis, day schools should be more affected by local income 
inequality, as they more directly adhere to the theory of local autarkies proposed by Hoxby. As a 
                                                
12 Although the majority of high school students are in the age range of fourteen to eighteen 
years, the fifteen to nineteen year range may approximate high-school aged individuals if lagged 
by one year. Changes in such large demographics are often negligible from year-to-year, which 
makes such a lag theoretically equivalent to the correct age range for most high school students. 
13 Boarding schools comprise approximately 70 percent of the observations in my dataset, 
limiting the sample size of this limited analysis to fewer than 85 schools.  
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result, if β1 is capturing the causal effect of rising local income inequality, it should have a 




 The results of my econometric analysis are presented in Tables 4 through 8. The baseline 
regression specification is displayed in Table 4. The results in this table suggest that, in most 
ways, private high schools react little to year-to-year changes in local income inequality.  
Coefficients in columns 1 through 4 should be interpreted as percent changes, while those 
in columns 5 and 6 should be interpreted as percentage point changes, given a one-unit increase 
in the corresponding ratio of income inequality or the state-specific unemployment rate.16 The 
90/50 ratio, which I posited earlier was the most relevant measure of income inequality for elite 
private educational institutions, ranges from 2 to 3 (i.e. the 90th percentile makes approximately 2 
to 3 times more than the median income). As such, a one-unit increase in this measure of income 
inequality would amount to a massive change in the income distribution—analogous to moving 
from Utah (a state with 90/50=2.31 in 2014) to New York (a state with 90/50=3.11 in 2014).17 
For the purposes of interpretation, I will assume a half-unit increase, which approximates the 
change in income inequality observed between 1987 and 2014 in the United States.18  
                                                
14 Note that a boarding school is considered to be any private high school that boards more than 
50 percent of its students in any given week; conversely, a day school must board fewer than 50 
percent of it students. As such, a more nuanced definition of day school—in which none of the 
students board—would be optimal, but would severely limit the power of the analysis due to the 
limited number of schools with such a characteristic. 
16 Columns 1-4 are approximated by natural logs. 
17 See Table 3 for detailed, state-specific income inequality measures.  
18 In 1987, the 90/50 ratio in the United States was 2.3l; in 2014, the same ratio was 2.91, 
equating to a 26 percent change, or slightly more than a half-unit difference.  
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Table 4 suggests that, for the most part, these private educational institutions do not 
translate increases in income inequality into large-scale changes in financial or enrollment 
decisions. For example, my estimates indicate that a half-unit increase in income inequality (as 
measured by the 90/50 ratio) is predicted to generate an increase in tuition of 5 percent 
(0.5*0.102). This estimate is not statistically significantly different from zero. The lack of 
significance is not generated from a lack of power, as I would be able to reject a 7 percent per 
year increase in tuition in response to the half-unit increase in the 90/50 ratio. Such an increase 
would equate to increasing tuition from its 2014 median value of $28,618 to a 2015 value of 
$30,921, which is not a large tuition increase for a private institution, particularly relative to the 
substantial increase in inequality under consideration. Similarly, the estimated relationships 
between inequality and expenses, revenues, and the proportion of non-white and financial aid 
students are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Again, it does not appear that it is 
a lack of statistical power that is generating these results.  
Yet, endowment values (and, presumably, assumed endowment spending) do appear to 
grow substantively in response to increasing high-end inequality.19 For every half-unit increase 
in the 90/50 ratio, the result in Table 4 indicates that an average school’s endowment increases 
by 48.4 percent. This result suggests that these schools are accumulating invested and gifted 
wealth (i.e. endowment and capital contributions), while simultaneously foregoing additional 
expenditures, tuition increases, and enrollment of socioeconomically and racially diverse 
students. The negative and insignificant coefficient on the 50/10 ratio confirms that these same 
institutions do not respond to changes in the income distribution that occur in the poorer 
                                                
19 Endowment is also meant to approximate endowment spending, which usually follows a 
designated policy rule (e.g. 5% of total endowment value).  
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deciles.20 This supports a causal interpretation of the impact of changes in the 90/50 ratio on 
endowment levels.  
 To test whether my initial hypothesis about the importance of local autarkies holds, I also 
ran regressions that were specific to school boarding policies. The first, shown in Table 5, 
displays the coefficients for boarding schools, which may be more likely to violate the 
assumption of local autarkies. Although the magnitudes of the coefficients change little from the 
baseline regression in Table 4, they are all statistically insignificant. This is because the 
decreased sample size limits the power of the analysis, making it more difficult to attain 
significance at the 5 percent level.  Again, as in Table 3, coefficients pertaining to the 50/10 ratio 
and the unemployment rate are all small and insignificant.     
Table 6 displays the results for a specification limited to day schools. The large, 
statistically significant coefficient for endowment supports the theory that day schools are 
particularly sensitive to conditions of local autarky, even with the severely restricted power of a 
regression on only 37 schools. In fact, the magnitude of this coefficient substantially exceeds that 
of the baseline regression, suggesting that day schools are more sensitive to local income 
inequality conditions. In this specification among day schools, a half-unit increase in the 90/50 
ratio is predicted to increase a school’s endowment value by about 70 percent. This result is 
statistically and economically significant (p-value = 6.8 percent).  
Unfortunately, limiting my regression specification to certain types of schools decreases 
the number of observations in my analysis, and, at times, restricts the power of the analysis. 
                                                
20 The 50/10 ratio produces a negative, significant coefficient on total expenses (in every 
variation of the specification, though most are insignificant). The magnitude of this coefficient is 
relatively small—for a half-unit change in inequality, revenues are projected to increase by less 
than 10 percent. Given that a half-unit change represents moving from a state of very low 
inequality to that of high inequality, and the borderline statistical significance, the coefficient 
seems irrelevant to my analysis.  
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Without this power, I am not able to confirm that effects are significantly different between day 
and boarding schools, and thus, establish whether boarding schools violate the condition of local 
autarky. In other words, given that the coefficient for endowment is very large and significant for 
day schools alone, I would be interested in asserting whether it is significantly different from the 
corresponding coefficient in the specification for boarding schools. But, because the coefficient 
on endowment is barely significantly different from zero for the day school specification, I am 
unable to conclude that it is statistically significant from the insignificant coefficient specific to 
boarding schools (see Tables 5 and 6 for exact coefficient values).  
Tables 7 and 8 display the results of regressions that limit the specification by non-
denominational and religious schools, respectively.22 Non-denominational schools display a 
large increase in endowment—more than 50 percent—as well as other, insignificant coefficients 
that correspond with, and often exceed, those of the baseline regression model (Table 7). 
Statistical power does not appear to limit interpretation, as the magnitudes required by the 
standard errors do not seem unreasonable (e.g. 17 percent change for revenues). The small, 
negative coefficient for the 50/10 ratio on total revenues is offset by a significant coefficient of 
more than twice the magnitude on the 90/50 ratio, suggesting again that the more impactful 
external circumstance is that of the 90/50 measure of inequality. All other coefficients are small 
and insignificant.  
At first glance, religiously-affiliated schools appear to display little reaction to local 
conditions of income inequality (Table 8). However, because they comprise only 32 percent of 
the overall dataset, a closer inspection of the results reveals that this specification may be 
                                                
22 Note that the definition of a religious school excludes parochial schools that receive most of 
their funding from the local diocese. Although 11 schools in the dataset are denoted as Catholic, 
their large endowments, substantial revenues, and high tuition differentiate them from traditional 
parochial schools.  
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particularly susceptible to limited statistical power. For example, the standard error pertaining to 
revenues per student requires that median revenues change by more than half (53 percent) in 
order to be considered statistically significant. This would equate to median revenues per student 
increasing or decreasing by $19,333, an unreasonably high amount that is evidence of the limited 
power in this specification. Nevertheless, the other coefficients for the 90/50 ratio do not appear 
to be limited by unreasonably large standard errors. For example, given a half-unit increase in 
the 90/50 ratio, tuition would only need to increase by 10 percent to be statistically significant at 




The results of my empirical model suggest that private secondary schools respond to 
growing income inequality by increasing the value of their endowments, while leaving financial 
aid and tuition policies unchanged. It is surprising, given that rising inequality disproportionately 
benefits students at the top of the distribution, that these larger endowment values are not 
accompanied by other socially optimal outcomes, such as the subsidization of financial aid 
students with their wealthier counterparts’ increased ability to pay. 
 The endowment, which private educational institutions use to supplement other revenue 
sources, contributes to the financial health of a school, but not necessarily its social value. 
Although I did not have the data to test for changes in capital giving to these institutions, it 
seems likely that increased contributions would be the driving force of growing endowment 
values. Thus, as income inequality rises—driven primarily by increases for the wealthiest—the 
average value of contributions should increase, resulting in the kind of endowment growth 
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observed in the results. If, as the educational arms race theory suggests, private educational 
institutions seek to attract the most elite students, these elevated endowment values could be 
used to increase capital expenditures, which would in turn be used to build or improve facilities, 
amenities, and services. However, by allocating the bulk of their increased endowments to 
internal operations, these institutions have fewer resources to admit poorer students—a 
conclusion that is supported in the data by a lack of significant changes to financial aid student 
enrollment.23  
 Furthermore, the results indicate that private educational institutions only respond 
significantly to local conditions of income inequality. Boarding schools, which usually draw a 
small portion of their students from outside the local area, display smaller, and less significant, 
changes in financial and enrollment policies. Day schools, which must enroll students in the local 
area, display more significant effects that are also of substantially larger magnitudes than those 
of private schools as an aggregate. Further research should investigate the effect of income 
inequality on post-secondary institutions that do not operate in a nationwide market (e.g. non-
elite private colleges and universities), and examine other useful indicators, such as capital 
giving and capital expenditures, to inform why private educational institutions may be opting 
against enrolling more low- and middle-income students.   
  
                                                
23 In addition, the insignificant coefficient on tuition may indicate that these institutions are 
hesitant to raise tuition (as they risk losing demand), and thereby increase resources meant to 
subsidize low-income students.  
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Figure 1:  Growing Income Inequality in the United States, 1987-2013 
 
 
































Figure 2: Percent Change of Income Inequality, 90/10 Ratio, 1987-2014 
 
Note: Data are interpolated for 1987 using 1980 and 1990 Census data, and extrapolated for 2014 using 2012 and 
2013 ACS data.  
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Note: Data are interpolated for 1987 using 1980 and 1990 Census data, and extrapolated for 2014 using 2013 and 
2012 ACS data.  
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Note: Data are interpolated for 1987 using 1980 and 1990 Census data, and extrapolated for 2014 using 2012 and 
2013 ACS data.  
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Figure 5: Expenses per Student, by Type of Institution, 1997-2011 
 
 
Note: Post-secondary institutions include only four-year, not-for-profit, private universities. Three-year moving 
averages. Comprehensive data unavailable before 1999 for post-secondary institutions.  
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Figure 6: Annual Tuition and Fees, by Type of Institution, 1986-2014 
Note: Post-secondary institutions include only four-year, not-for-profit, private universities. Three-year moving 
averages are displayed. 
Source: Baum and Ma (2014). Retrieved 25 March 2015 from http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2014-


















































































































































Figure 9: Median Enrollment by School Type, 1987-2014 
 




Figure 10: Distribution of Endowment, 2014 
 
























The Kamehameha Schools HI $9,000  
The Milton Hershey School PA $7,800  
Phillips Exeter Academy NH $1,000  
St. Paul’s School NH $438  
Hotchkiss School CT $430  
Deerfield Academy MA $386  
The Peddie School NJ $307  
The Groton School MA $294  
Albuquerque Academy NM $287  
Choate Rosemary Hall CT $267  
Lawrenceville School NJ $264  
Woodberry Forest School VA $250  
Westminster Schools GA $239  
Taft School CT $202  
Mercersburg Academy PA $198  
Punahou School HI $177  
Loomis Chaffee  CT $175  
 
Source: Fabrikant (2008). Retrieved 10 April 2015, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/26/business/26prep.html?pagewanted=all
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Table 2: Median Values of NAIS School Characteristics, by State and in per-Student Terms, 2014 
 
Notes: All monetary units expressed in constant 2010 dollars, divided by corresponding 2014 enrollment for each school. Financial aid 
students and non-white students are expressed as proportions of total enrollment. Non-white students do not include international 
students of color. Due to missing data, statistics for Arizona are from 2011, statistics for New Mexico are from 2013, and endowment 
per student for Illinois from 2013.  
 


















Alabama $33,532 $17,408 $23,376 $23,022 31% 19% 1 
Arizona $34,898 $21,617 $41,921 $38,888 64% 16% 1 
California $36,464 $32,615 $32,555 $34,201 25% 38% 16 
Colorado $110,585 $25,744 $25,603 $44,704 40% 11% 2 
Connecticut $91,155 $35,981 $47,151 $47,918 31% 18% 18 
Delaware $293,735 $26,483 $38,849 $38,962 43% 20% 2 
Georgia $21,192 $16,372 $17,161 $17,196 17% 20% 1 
Illinois $50,452 $33,435 $40,323 $40,621 26% 23% 1 
Indiana $176,651 $19,798 $43,334 $41,728 31% 16% 2 
Massachusetts $78,349 $34,862 $41,587 $42,593 32% 21% 24 
Maryland $51,664 $25,053 $35,442 $35,743 51% 24% 4 
Maine $54,807 $32,260 $41,248 $41,593 51% 13% 3 
Michigan $137,861 $29,290 $61,999 $64,446 59% 11% 1 
Missouri $54,778 $21,691 $23,398 $34,124 28% 13% 3 
North Carolina $103,420 $21,138 $38,322 $36,112 31% 16% 4 
New Hampshire $27,529 $28,023 $35,178 $35,910 44% 9% 7 
New Jersey $266,974 $33,123 $57,713 $53,441 35% 25% 4 
New Mexico $25,719 $18,259 $19,417 $19,442 28% 28% 1 
New York $70,551 $29,345 $44,781 $44,114 38% 12% 9 
Ohio $26,635 $14,450 $35,993 $32,359 67% 11% 1 
Pennsylvania $217,293 $31,731 $37,643 $36,408 41% 19% 5 
Rhode Island $304,622 $32,099 $49,060 $49,806 30% 21% 2 
Tennessee $553,572 $19,011 $22,633 $27,308 24% 17% 2 
Utah $63,539 $23,810 $34,534 $38,725 36% 10% 1 
Virginia $120,088 $20,689 $37,436 $46,206 36% 14% 10 
Vermont $32,950 $24,638 $36,530 $36,765 25% 6% 3 
Wisconsin $48,444 $14,005 $37,662 $37,045 53% 26% 2 
United States $65,552 $29,804 $37,504 $40,439 32% 19% 130 
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Note: Data are interpolated for 1987 using 1980 and 1990 Census data, and extrapolated for 2014 using 2013 and 
2012 ACS data.  
 























Alabama 2.95 5.01 14.79 15.9% 5.4% 22.2% 
Arizona 2.95 3.77 11.12 22.5% -3.9% 17.7% 
California 2.93 4.64 13.58 20.6% 15.6% 39.3% 
Colorado 2.71 3.89 10.53 16.6% -0.5% 15.9% 
Connecticut 2.94 4.39 12.91 29.3% 8.0% 39.6% 
Delaware 3.03 3.20 9.69 35.9% -17.1% 12.7% 
Georgia 2.83 4.38 12.42 16.7% -7.7% 7.8% 
Illinois 2.86 4.82 13.80 23.7% 8.5% 34.2% 
Indiana 2.47 3.91 9.66 11.3% 0.9% 12.3% 
Massachusetts 2.88 4.92 14.16 24.6% 6.6% 32.9% 
Maryland 2.65 4.49 11.89 19.1% 14.0% 35.7% 
Maine 2.37 3.61 8.56 7.7% -6.1% 1.1% 
Michigan 2.66 4.26 11.32 14.9% -3.3% 11.2% 
Missouri 2.57 4.53 11.66 7.2% 9.2% 17.1% 
North Carolina 2.91 4.05 11.80 23.5% -5.4% 16.8% 
New Hampshire 2.58 3.97 10.27 22.4% 11.0% 35.9% 
New Jersey 2.97 4.57 13.57 28.4% 8.6% 39.4% 
New Mexico 2.86 5.17 14.78 14.2% 20.3% 37.4% 
New York 3.11 4.70 14.65 22.4% -1.7% 20.4% 
Ohio 2.79 4.10 11.41 23.3% -2.7% 19.9% 
Pennsylvania 2.80 4.36 12.18 20.2% 7.4% 29.1% 
Rhode Island 2.54 3.85 9.78 11.7% -12.3% -2.0% 
Tennessee 2.72 4.21 11.46 10.5% -5.7% 4.2% 
Utah 2.31 3.88 8.96 7.2% 9.8% 17.7% 
Virginia 2.96 4.00 11.85 25.7% -2.6% 22.4% 
Vermont 3.03 4.94 14.97 35.3% 38.2% 86.9% 
Wisconsin 2.64 3.86 10.21 21.7% 3.1% 25.4% 
United States 2.91 4.49 12.91 26.0% 10.5% 32.6% 
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Table 4: Impact of Income Inequality on Private High School Finances and Enrollment, 1987-2014 
 



























90/50 Ratio 0.103 0.968** -0.179* 0.00947 0.0986 0.0250 
 (0.0727) (0.423) (0.108) (0.210) (0.0633) (0.0255) 
 
50/10 Ratio -0.0331 -0.0621 -0.0422 -0.0925* -0.000270 0.000676 
 (0.0426) (0.168) (0.0495) (0.0502) (0.0217) (0.0114) 
 
Unemployment Rate -0.00536 -0.0171 -0.00330 -0.00102 0.000280 -0.00207 
 (0.00531) (0.0205) (0.00568) (0.0122) (0.00221) (0.00208) 
 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Schools 124 112 119 120 118 119 
       
 
Notes: Dependent variables and means in columns 1-4 are in natural log, per-student terms. Dependent variables in columns 5-6 are in percent terms. Standard 
errors are in parentheses (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01). All specifications are weighted by total enrollment and include measures of state-specific public high 
school student-teacher ratios and the aggregate, as well as racial, makeup of the 15-19 year-old populations in each state. School and year fixed effects are also 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Levels of income inequality were extrapolated for 2014 and interpolated for the years 1987-1989, 
1991-1999, and 2001-2004, using Census and ACS figures. All covariates are lagged by one year to account for reaction time. Student-teacher ratios and 
population ages were extrapolated for the years 2012-2014.   
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Table 5: Impact of Income Inequality on Private High School Finances and Enrollment on Boarding Schools, 1987-2014 
 





























90/50 Ratio 0.113 0.948 -0.0763 0.181 0.0832 0.0544 
 (0.0912) (0.590) (0.145) (0.180) (0.104) (0.0362) 
 
50/10 Ratio -0.0522 0.0470 -0.0321 -0.0565 0.0290 0.00931 
 (0.0560) (0.158) (0.0644) (0.0608) (0.0199) (0.0144) 
 
Unemployment Rate -0.00533 -0.00434 -0.00129 -0.0138* -0.00216 -0.00299 
 (0.00774) (0.0264) (0.00883) (0.00820) (0.00297) (0.00336) 
 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Schools 83 74 79 80 79 79 
       
 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. A boarding school is any school that, on average, boards more than 50 percent of its students during any given week of the semester.  
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Table 6: Impact of Income Inequality on Private High School Finances and Enrollment on Day Schools, 1987-2014 
 





























90/50 Ratio 0.0913 1.384* -0.147 -0.194 0.0803 0.0164 
 (0.135) (0.758) (0.158) (0.405) (0.0874) (0.0367) 
 
50/10 Ratio -0.0301 -0.166 0.0245 -0.0481 -0.0518 0.00618 
 (0.0393) (0.321) (0.0638) (0.0917) (0.0339) (0.0160) 
 
Unemployment Rate -0.00377 -0.0210 -0.00460 0.00857 0.000816 -0.000131 
 (0.00766) (0.0357) (0.00592) (0.0216) (0.00319) (0.00179) 
 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Schools 42 37 39 40 39 40 
       
 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. A day school is any school that, on average, boards less than 50 percent of its students during any given week of the semester.   
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Table 7: Impact of Income Inequality on Private High School Finances and Enrollment on non-Denominational Schools, 1987-2014 
 





























90/50 Ratio 0.143 1.051* -0.140 0.300* 0.103 0.0267 
 (0.102) (0.558) (0.126) (0.174) (0.0860) (0.0317) 
 
50/10 Ratio -0.0861 0.0679 -0.0185 -0.123* -0.0103 0.0151 
 (0.0560) (0.188) (0.0652) (0.0736) (0.0362) (0.0137) 
 
Unemployment Rate 0.00124 -0.0209 -0.00196 -0.00829 0.00127 -0.00260 
 (0.00613) (0.0219) (0.00720) (0.0100) (0.00283) (0.00273) 
 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Schools 85 77 82 82 81 82 
       
 
Notes: See notes for Table 4. I assume that schools that do not self-identify with any religious affiliation, or identify as “non-denominational” are secular.  
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Table 8: Impact of Income Inequality on Private High School Finances and Enrollment on Religious Schools, 1987-2014 
 





























90/50 Ratio 0.150 0.539 -0.202 -0.691 0.0659 0.0274 
 (0.109) (0.550) (0.211) (0.543) (0.0519) (0.0480) 
 
50/10 Ratio 0.00456 -0.211 -0.0611 -0.0585 0.0116 -0.0255 
 (0.0463) (0.257) (0.0538) (0.0603) (0.0160) (0.0183) 
 
Unemployment Rate -0.0144** -0.0103 -0.00132 0.0113 -0.00195 -0.00212 
 (0.00587) (0.0308) (0.00960) (0.0250) (0.00359) (0.00277) 
 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Number of Schools 39 35 37 37 37 38 
       
 
Note: See notes to Table 4. A religious school is defined as a non-parochial school affiliated with a religion, but whose funding is not wholly dependent on a 
religious organization. Under this definition, most Catholic schools are excluded. 
  
 
